WeeklySA_AdminFAULTLINE: Deputy Trade and Industry Minister Alexandra Abrahams’ market-first framing risks deepening inequality, fracturing the GNU, and sidelining the very communities South Africa’s economy must uplift to grow sustainably…
By Ido Lekota
Alexandra Abrahams’ recent appointment to the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition in November 2025 has placed her squarely at the faultline of South Africa’s fragile Government of National Unity (GNU). It is here—between market-driven growth and long-overdue economic redress—that ideological tensions simmer just beneath the surface.
Abrahams’ emerging posture, framed as an “either-or” choice between unfettered market efficiency and targeted interventions such as Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE), oversimplifies the deeply embedded structural inequalities inherited from apartheid.
In doing so, it risks not only policy fragmentation but also the political stability of the GNU itself. Rooted in her Democratic Alliance background, this framing casts economic redress as antithetical to competitiveness—echoing long-standing neoliberal critiques of so-called “government-run transformation.”
Yet this binary collapses under South Africa’s lived realities. More than 55% of black South Africans remain trapped in poverty, while youth unemployment in marginalised townships hovers at an alarming 64%. In such a context, polarisation is not merely theoretical—it directly erodes quality of life for the economically excluded black majority and undermines the GNU’s promise of inclusive prosperity.
At its core, Abrahams’ stance reflects a worldview that treats South Africa’s economic challenges as a zero-sum game: either deregulate aggressively and unleash private enterprise, or submit to what she and her DA allies characterise as racially prescriptive quotas that deter investment. This framing mirrors pre-appointment rhetoric from within the DA, where transformation initiatives were routinely critiqued in favour of vague appeals to “inclusive growth” and enterprise liberalisation.
Since taking office, Abrahams has advocated for deeper international economic ties—such as strengthened collaboration with Malaysia—emphasising trade and cooperation without overt reference to equity mechanisms.
But this approach risks ignoring apartheid’s enduring economic scars: spatial distortions where Gauteng-based firms control over 60% of exports while rural Eastern Cape households struggle for basic market entry; black ownership in JSE-listed companies stagnating at 10–15% against a 34% target; and a textile sector vital to township economies that remains dominated by legacy capital despite decades of redress policies.
Ironically, data from the DTIC’s own industrial strategies undermines the argument that equity and growth are mutually exclusive. Since 2000, B-BBEE-linked preferential procurement has helped generate over a million jobs. Special Economic Zones (SEZs) further demonstrate that equity conditions can coexist with investor incentives, attracting foreign direct investment while advancing inclusion.
The GNU—formed after the 2024 elections under President Cyril Ramaphosa—demands precisely this kind of nuance. It requires balancing the ANC’s commitment to economic transformation with the DA’s insistence on fiscal discipline and market confidence. Abrahams’ binary framing disrupts this equilibrium, alienating stakeholders invested in redress and inviting policy vetoes rather than consensus.
History reinforces this lesson. Past renewals of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) succeeded not despite equity commitments, but because they reassured international partners of South Africa’s social compact.
More recently, the International Monetary Fund and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development diagnostics for 2025 have underscored inequality as the single greatest brake on growth, warning that exclusion fuels instability and caps GDP expansion below its potential.
By dismissing B-BBEE as inefficient, Abrahams risks sending a damaging signal to black entrepreneurs, women-led SMMEs, and coloured youth in SETA programmes—that their pathways into the economy are expendable.
In a coalition already strained by ideological fault lines, this fosters distrust rather than confidence.
The consequences are most acute for marginalised communities navigating intersecting barriers. Black women in Johannesburg townships, for instance, contend not only with racial exclusion but also childcare burdens, transport deficits, and gender wage gaps. Generic deregulation offers little relief without tailored interventions.
An either-or approach exacerbates these silos, threatening blended instruments such as SEZ equity grants—which have created over 50 000 jobs since 2014 precisely by addressing these intersections.
Community engagement studies show that binary policy debates erode participation. Declining SETA uptake among Indian and coloured youth reflects perceptions that economic policy has become a zero-sum contest.
In sectors like textiles and manufacturing, neoliberal prescriptions have historically failed to reverse spatial inequality, leaving rural households disconnected while urban elites consolidate gains. The result is heightened unrest risk, stalled 4IR integration, and evaporating skills pipelines in high-unemployment provinces.
Intersectional strategies offer a proven alternative. Global frameworks—from OECD education models to inclusive health systems—emphasise co-design with affected communities, power analysis to dismantle layered barriers, and data-driven adjustments that deliver multi-strand support.
In South Africa, this approach has already shown results: SEZ programmes that accounted for rural black women’s needs through flexible training and quotas boosted participation by 25% without deterring investors.
Applied to Abrahams’ portfolio, intersectionality would recast B-BBEE from burden to lever—aligning ownership targets with smart deregulation to channel FDI into township and rural hubs. Evidence from participatory evaluations consistently shows that such hybrid models outperform conflict-driven approaches, building economic bridges where binaries burn them.
Ultimately, Abrahams’ current framing risks undermining GNU effectiveness by delaying inclusive reforms with tangible consequences: constrained capital access, faltering township SMMEs, and deepening poverty as growth accrues to established players rather than the 64% youth cohort desperate for entry.
Politically, her appointment is a litmus test for the coalition itself—will DA influence dilute equity imperatives, or evolve into pragmatic synthesis?
Post-2025 IMF consultations have made the stakes clear: inequality is growth’s greatest drag. Sustainable development in South Africa requires policies that honour apartheid’s economic debts while credibly courting global capital—not false choices that fracture the nation anew.
Abrahams’ role, then, must evolve—from partisan critic to coalition architect. Her calls for international collaboration hold promise, but only if infused with intersectional equity that centres marginalised voices.
Failure risks policy paralysis and renewed social fracture. For the black majority still bearing apartheid’s economic yoke, the cost is real: forgone jobs, persistent poverty, and eroding faith in democracy’s dividends.
The GNU’s success—and South Africa’s trajectory—depends on transcending either-or thinking and proving that genuine growth lifts all, not just the already risen.
*Ido Lekota is an independent journalist and political commentator
