WeeklySA_AdminPIVOT: Kenya will host the 2026 France–Africa Summit next week, the first to be held in an English-speaking African country. Analysts view it as part of France’s broader attempt to reconfigure its influence and strategic interests in Africa amid Sahel’s increasing slip from its control…
By Nicholas Mwangi
From May to 11 to 12, Nairobi will host a two-day France–Africa Summit, jointly convened by the governments of France and Kenya.
French President Emmanuel Macron is expected in the country alongside 30 African heads of state and government, hosted by President William Ruto.
Framed around themes of innovation, economic growth, business cooperation, partnership, and security, the summit officially aims to “affirm a shared commitment to developing common, mutually beneficial solutions based on effective multilateralism and a spirit of transformative partnership”.
The summit, officially called “Africa Forward Summit: Africa-France Partnerships for Innovation and Growth”, has already raised major questions: Why is the Summit being held in Anglophone East Africa? And, why is France increasingly pursuing high-level engagement in that region?
The Nairobi summit appears to be, not just a platform for development cooperation or business networking, but as part of a broader French strategic recalibration at a moment when its historic sphere of influence in Africa is undergoing profound strain. France’s expanding engagement with Anglophone Africa must be situated within the context of its declining influence in the Sahel.
Pan African resistance
The shift of strategy has already triggered resistance from Pan-African and progressive movements in Kenya. Progressive groups in Kenya and the continent have come together to organise the Pan-Africanism Summit Against Imperialism (PASAI), a parallel counter-summit in Nairobi. PASAI’s critique reframes many of the summit’s official themes through a more Pan-African and anti-imperialist lens.
On questions of finance, the coalition rejects discussions around merely “reforming” the international financial system, instead calling for the dismantling of neo-colonial monetary structures and the cancellation of African debt. The critique draws historical connections to systems such as the CFA Franc, long viewed by critics as mechanisms of continued French economic control in parts of Francophone Africa.
The coalition also challenges the summit’s emphasis on green industrialisation and energy transition. PASAI argues instead we should be confronting the root causes of climate change – not the false solutions of green capitalism.
The Sahel rupture
Over the last several years, anti-French sentiment has intensified across the Sahel. Military governments in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, installed through patriotic coups, expelled French troops and downgraded diplomatic relations with Paris in response to popular pressure.
Public demonstrations against French military presence have grown in frequency across French West Africa, not just limited to the AES countries, as many young Africans have questioned whether decades of French intervention has delivered either security or meaningful development.
This emerging political mood in the Sahel has been increasingly shaped by demands for sovereignty, anti-imperialism, and rejection of foreign military control. France’s presence, once justified through counterterrorism operations and “security partnerships,” is now widely perceived by critics, activists, and sections of leadership in the continent as a continuation of neo-colonial influence under a security guise.
The persistence of insecurity in the region has further complicated France’s position. In Mali, the coordinated attacks which unfolded on the weekend of May 2, including the attack which killed Mali’s Defence Minister Sadio Camara, cast a light on the continuing instability that has defined the Sahel for decades despite (or because of) prolonged foreign military involvement.
At the same time, the Francophone bloc remains among the poorest regions globally despite decades of close ties with Paris. The Francophone countries in West Africa rank in the 40 least developed countries in the world, while neighbouring Anglophone countries do not.
This reality has strengthened arguments advanced by African intellectuals and activists who describe Françafrique as a neo-colonial system that preserved French economic and strategic interests while constraining sovereignty and limiting structural transformation in African states.
It is within this historical context that France’s turn toward East Africa must be understood. Progressive movements in Kenya increasingly view the Nairobi summit not simply as a diplomatic or economic forum, but as part of a broader French “reset” strategy following setbacks in the Sahel and the emergence of a more multipolar global order.
As powers such as China, Russia, and Turkey deepen their engagement across Africa, France is seeking to re-establish influence through new alliances and regional footholds.
Why East Africa and why Kenya?
East Africa presents itself as a strategic frontier for this repositioning. Unlike the politically volatile Sahel, Kenya is viewed by Western powers as relatively stable, economically influential, and strategically positioned within regional and global networks. It has also historically served as a gateway for Western economic, diplomatic, and security interests in the region.
Kenya’s capital Nairobi already functions as a diplomatic, financial, and logistical hub for international organisations and foreign capital operating in East Africa. The Kenyan capital is home to the regional office of the IMF, the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the African Development Bank, and others. Hosting the summit in Nairobi is therefore highly symbolic. From multinational corporations and international financial institutions to security cooperation frameworks, Nairobi occupies a central role within broader geopolitical strategies on the continent.
President William Ruto’s foreign policy orientation has continuously positioned Kenya within close alignment to Western strategic and economic interests. In 2025, Kenya signed a five-year defence cooperation agreement with France. In 2024, Kenya was designated as an official non-NATO ally. Without the regard and the extent to which such alignment reflects domestic development priorities versus external geopolitical expectations.
Kenya’s growing role as a platform for Western diplomatic initiatives, including the France–Africa Summit, suggests a deeper integration into evolving global power structures.
France’s renewed interest in Anglophone Africa therefore reflects an attempt to diversify influence beyond the weakening foundations of Françafrique, while adapting to an Africa that is increasingly asserting political agency within a multipolar world.
While it presents this shift with the rhetoric of “equal partnership” and “effective multilateralism,” activists maintain that its underlying objectives remain largely consistent; the preservation of strategic influence, access to economic opportunities, and the maintenance of geopolitical relevance on the continent. It appears that Anglophone countries may be France’s new frontier. – People’s Despatch
Comment
SA cannot carry Africa’s burdens alone
South Africa must continue to reject xenophobia, criminality and violence against fellow Africans. No grievance, no matter how serious, can justify attacks on innocent people, looting, intimidation or hatred directed at foreign nationals. The country’s Constitution, its liberation history and its Pan-African commitments demand better. But honesty also requires acknowledging the growing pressures driving frustration inside South Africa — pressures that many governments across the continent appear reluctant to confront openly.
For more than three decades after the dawn of democracy in 1994, South Africa has carried not only the burden of repairing the damage caused by apartheid, but also the weight of becoming an economic refuge for millions from across the continent. While other African nations gained independence decades earlier, South Africa emerged from apartheid late, inheriting deep racial inequality, mass poverty, unemployment, spatial injustice and fractured public institutions.
The democratic government was expected to transform a deeply unequal society while simultaneously opening the country to the continent and the world. Yet, almost immediately after liberation, South Africa’s porous borders experienced a massive influx of migrants seeking jobs, healthcare, education, business opportunities and security. Many came legally and contribute meaningfully to the economy. Others arrived undocumented, overwhelming already strained systems in townships, informal settlements, schools, clinics and labour markets.
Today, millions of South Africans — particularly young people — remain unemployed. Entire communities are trapped in poverty while crime, corruption and collapsing local governance continue to erode public confidence. In many areas, residents feel abandoned by the state and increasingly compete over scarce economic opportunities and failing public services. This does not excuse xenophobia. But, neither can these realities simply be dismissed as irrational prejudice. President Cyril Ramaphosa and International Relations Minister Ronald Lamola are correct to argue that migration cannot be discussed without confronting its root causes. South Africa did not create the governance failures, instability, corruption, conflict and economic collapse driving migration flows across parts of the continent.
Some African countries now criticising South Africa must also reflect on why so many of their own citizens feel compelled to leave home in search of dignity and survival elsewhere. It is easier to condemn South Africa than to fix failing economies, weak institutions and political instability that continue pushing people southwards.
South Africa cannot become the permanent sanctuary for every crisis on the continent while its own citizens remain trapped in unemployment, inequality and hopelessness more than 30 years into democracy.
The solution lies neither in hatred nor denial. It lies in stronger border management, lawful migration systems, regional economic development, job creation and greater accountability from African governments themselves. Pan-African solidarity cannot mean that South Africa alone must absorb the consequences of failures elsewhere while being condemned for struggling under the pressure.
